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ABSTRACT 
This Article addresses the connection between antitrust law and the 
market for corporate control.  It argues that antitrust law should only seek 
to regulate the market for corporate control when there is a problem of 
competition that corporate law cannot fix on its own.  The Article revisits 
various suggested problems of competition in the market for corporate 
control and argues that, in each case, there is no need for the involvement 
of antitrust law.  The Article then highlights one instance in the market for 
corporate control where antitrust law is needed—and suggests a minor 
change to enable it to do so better.  The Article concludes that, by and 
large, antitrust law is filling its correct role in the market for corporate 
control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust law and corporate law are generally seen as different beasts.  
For over one hundred years, antitrust law has been “divorced” from 
corporate law,
1
 and one scholar has called it “a stretch, and a big one” to 
argue that antitrust law is part of corporate law.
2
  The two bodies of law are 
taught and practiced differently.  Large firms that deal with corporate 
matters have dedicated and separate antitrust departments.  A corporate law 
class will only briefly touch upon certain topics in antitrust law, and an 
antitrust course is more likely to cover economics than corporate law.
3
  The 
separation between the two areas of law has “historical and professional” 
roots.
4
  Corporate law came first; antitrust law only became a separate 
discipline in the 1950s, a half-century after corporate law.
5
  And because 
there has been a “pattern of oscillation” over the past 120 years whereby 
the one body of law is strong at a time when the other is weak, academic 
dialogue between the two disciplines has been rare.
6
 
Despite—or perhaps because of—this supposed separation, academics 
have argued that they should be linked.
7
  Antitrust law seeks to protect 
competition in markets, and the market for corporate control is a market 
like any other.
8
  Furthermore, it is important and valuable, worth trillions of 
 
 1.  Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16, 27 (2008). 
 2.  Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 245 (2002). 
 3.  See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 252, 449-50, 587-94 (4th ed. 2012) (two brief mentions of 
competition law in addition to discussion of state takeover statutes); WILLIAM KLEIN ET AL., 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (7th ed. 2009) (leading corporations casebook which does not 
mention antitrust at all); THOMAS MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST 
LAW AND ITS ORIGINS (4th ed. 2009) (no mention of the market for corporate control). 
 4.  Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 833, 842 (2011). 
 5.  Id. at 842-43. 
 6.  Id. at 850. 
 7.  See infra note 10. 
 8.  The Sherman Antitrust Act, the preeminent achievement in antitrust law, does not 
mention “markets,” instead limiting itself to “trade” and “commerce.”  See Sherman 
Antitrust Act §§ 1-3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, 6a (2006) (prohibiting the restraint of interstate 
trade or commerce and prescribing penalties for violations).  The scope of the Act was 
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dollars each year.
9
  It would seem reasonable, therefore, that antitrust law 
should ensure that the market for corporate control functions in a 
competitive fashion. 
The initial work in this field was done by Professor Edward Rock,
10
 
and the views that Professor Rock expressed have been reanimated recently 
by Thomas Piraino and Spencer Waller.
11
  But this area of law is not simply 
of academic interest.  Various court cases have dealt with the intersection 
of antitrust laws and the market for corporate control.
12
  In a case currently 
before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
Dahl v. Bain Capital, a group of plaintiffs is seeking a remedy against a 
group of private equity firms for violating section 1 of the Sherman Act in 
allegedly colluding in leveraged buyout deals over the last decade.
13
  This 
Article builds on the work of Rock and Piraino, to which it is indebted, but 
suggests a different approach to resolving the question of tension between 
antitrust law and the market for corporate control. 
Three clarifying notes are in order here.  First, references to antitrust 
law in this Article are to federal antitrust law, unless otherwise noted.  
Second, because of Delaware’s importance as a state of incorporation, I 
generally focus on Delaware corporate law.  Third, I take a broad, although 
common, view of corporate law, and include under this heading, the 
 
originally disputed:  For example, one early decision ruled that the government did not have 
the right to regulate intrastate manufacturing, as this was not classified as “commerce.”  
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).  Since these early days, however, 
the Court has held that the Sherman Act exists to preserve the smooth functioning of the 
market.  See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“The 
purpose of the Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to 
protect the public from the failure of the market.”). 
 9.  See BLOOMBERG, 2012 M&A OUTLOOK 5 (Anita Khalili et al., 2011), available at 
http://about.bloomberg.com/pdf/manda.pdf (reporting that over $2 trillion worth of deals 
took place in 2011). 
 10.  Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control., 77 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1365 (1989) [hereinafter Rock, Corporate Control]; Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law 
Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497 (1992) [hereinafter Rock, Antitrust 
Lens]. 
 11.  Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Implications of “Going Private” and Other 
Changes of Corporate Control, 49 B.C. L. REV. 971 (2008); Waller, supra note 4. 
 12.  See, e.g., Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1990) (adjudicating a 
case in which a shareholder brought suit against rival bidders for cooperating in their 
bidding activities); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(dealing with the question of antitrust violations in a tender offer bid). 
 13.  Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying 
the private equity firms’ motion to dismiss).  The suit is still in progress, and, on account of 
the editing schedule of this Article, I have not attempted to update this piece to take account 
of all the latest developments.  See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Eric Lichtblau, E-Mails Hint at 
Collusion Among the Largest Equity Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at B1 (discussing 
developments in the case). 
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Williams Act, a piece of federal securities regulation that has had a major 
impact on the market for corporate control. 
Part I of this Article traces the origins of antitrust and corporate law.  
Part II discusses the potential for conflict between corporate and antitrust 
law.  It shows how courts have managed to resolve conflicts between the 
two bodies of law in the past, and sets out a principle by which such 
conflicts might be resolved.  This principle is that corporate law should be 
given the opportunity to resolve anticompetitive situations in the market for 
corporate control on its own, and federal antitrust law should confine itself 
to dealing with those anticompetitive situations that corporate law cannot 
resolve.  Part III explores three areas where it has been argued that antitrust 
law should solve an anticompetitive situation in the market for corporate 
control, and argues that in each instance, corporate law can resolve any 
issues on its own.  Therefore, corporate and antitrust law do not conflict in 
these areas.  Part IV discusses one area—mergers and acquisitions—in 
which there is a problem of competition that corporate law cannot solve on 
its own.  It suggests that the antitrust legislative response in this area is 
largely appropriate, and offers only a minor suggestion that would ensure 
that the approach taken by antitrust law in this area does not conflict with 
corporate law.  In sum, this Article concludes that, insofar as the market for 
corporate control is concerned, antitrust law is generally playing its proper 
role. 
 
I. ANTITRUST AND CORPORATE LAW SIDE-BY-SIDE 
A. The Path of Federal Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law can be traced back for over four hundred years.
14
  
Modern antitrust law in the United States, however, begins with the 
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.
15
  Before the passage of the Sherman 
Act, restraints existed on the excessive accumulation of capital—in state 
law.  Until the late 1880s, state corporate law prevented one company from 
 
 14.  See Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266 
(K.B.) (holding that a patent granting a monopoly over the importation of playing cards into 
England was “utterly void”).  Common law courts first established a doctrine against 
restraint of trade in Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B.).  But questions of 
competition were before the courts as early as the fifteenth century.  See The Schoolmaster 
Case, Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, pl. 19 (1410) (Eng.) (holding that it was lawful competition 
for a schoolmaster to set up a new school in competition with an older school). 
 15.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
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holding another company’s stock.
16
  This acted as a powerful restraint on 
companies’ ability to buy competitors.  Under the doctrine of ultra vires, 
corporations were only permitted to carry out acts for which they had been 
granted permission in their charter—and taking over other corporations was 
not among them.
17
  Courts rationalized the doctrine of ultra vires on the 
ground that an ultra vires contract, such as a takeover, worked “a diversion 
of capital from the objects contemplated by the charter to the detriment of 
non-assenting shareholders,” and was thus illegal.
18
 
To evade the restrictions on cross-shareholdings, corporations began 
to organize as trusts.
19
  Several states quickly recognized the intent behind 
the new form, and Ohio and New York successfully sued to force the 
dissolution of two of the largest entities—the Standard Oil and Sugar 
Trusts.
20
  Frustrated by these efforts, industrialists (and their lawyers) 
reconsidered how the corporate form could be made to serve their 
purposes.  What happened next was a critical moment in corporate and 
antitrust law:  New Jersey enacted a corporation law that permitted cross-
shareholdings.
21
 
In response to this new law, a wave of trusts, including the Sugar 
Trust, reincorporated in New Jersey.
22
  The state became so wealthy as a 
result of incorporation and franchise fees that its entire budget was paid by 
these corporation taxes alone.
23
  Other states attempted to copy New Jersey 
by enacting their own cross-shareholding statutes, but had little success.  
The ultra vires doctrine, which had acted as a restraint on monopolies, was 
now dead.  Because corporations could flow to any state that copied New 
Jersey, the states could only revive the doctrine by acting together.  But 
such cooperation was impossible because the incentive for a state to cheat 
was too high.
24
 
Corporate law had kept a check on company size, but now failed to do 
so.  Congress recognized that the states were unwilling or unable to control 
 
 16.  Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 191 (1985). 
 17.  See Clyde L. Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court 
Decisions, 42 W. VA. L.Q. 179, 206 (1936) (noting that in cases dealing with ultra vires 
contracts, the Supreme Court has followed the practice of declaring them void). 
 18.  Id. at 206–07. 
 19.  Horwitz, supra note 16, at 193. 
 20.  Id. at 194. 
 21.  Id. at 194–95. 
 22.  Id. at 195. 
 23.  Id. at 195. 
 24.  Cheating or defecting on an agreement is a typical collective action problem and is 
relevant to states as well as to individual actors and smaller entities.  See generally Richard 
E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1241 (1997) (explaining the 
collective action problem of cheating faced by states). 
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the trusts and therefore stepped in by enacting the Sherman Act.  Section 1 
of the Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations,” and section 2 prohibits acting, or 
attempting to act, as a monopoly.
25
 
Federal antitrust law has served many goals since the Sherman Act 
was passed.
26
  At different points,
27
 the courts have evaluated business 
practices (i) construing the Sherman Act literally and narrowly;
28
 (ii) under 
a flexible “rule of reason” standard;
29
 (iii) under a rigid “per se” approach;
30
 
and (iv) under an efficiency-driven “consumer welfare” standard, 
championed by Robert Bork.
31
  Although the history of antitrust law does 
not conveniently divide into exact periods, it is possible to identify some 
general approaches to antitrust law that change over time. 
In the first period of the application of the Sherman Act, the courts 
were initially reluctant to strike down mergers—but not for reasons relating 
to their construction of antitrust law itself.  The first major case under the 
Sherman Act was United States v. E.C. Knight Co., in which the Supreme 
Court declined to enjoin the American Sugar Refining Company’s takeover 
of four Philadelphia sugar refineries, which would give the company 
“nearly complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar within the 
United States.”
32
  The Court noted that the Sherman Act aimed at the 
monopolization of “trade or commerce” but held that the contract to take 
over the Philadelphia refineries was “an attempt to monopolize, or the 
actual monopoly of . . . manufacture . . . .”
33
  Such behavior fell outside the 
scope of the Sherman Act’s prohibition because Congress did not have the 
power to regulate manufacturing under the Commerce Clause.
34
 
 
 25.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). 
 26.  Id. §§ 1–7. 
 27.  I present one common historical division of the periods of antitrust law, but this is 
by no means the only one.  See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 555–56 (2012) (demarcating the history of U.S. antitrust policy into 
four separate “cycles”). 
 28.  See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (reading the 
Sherman Act literally and narrowly). 
 29.  See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 66–68 (1911) (using 
the “rule of reason” standard). 
 30.  See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217 (1940) 
(using the “per se” approach). 
 31.  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 
(1978) (“The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of 
consumer welfare . . . .”). 
 32.  E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 9. 
 33.  Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
 34.  Id. at 16–17. 
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But the Court soon changed its views on the scope of both the 
Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act.  In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. 
United States, the Court carefully distinguished E.C. Knight Co. and held 
that even though the act of manufacturing goods did not affect interstate 
commerce, an agreement to sell such manufactured goods did.
35
  This 
holding was overruled in Swift & Co. v. United States, in which the Court 
adopted a theory of a “current of commerce” between the states, which the 
government had the power to regulate.
36
  This decision made clear the 
course for a much more expansive interpretation of the Sherman Act, 
covering the activities associated with interstate commerce today. 
At the same time, however, the Court changed its literal interpretation 
of the phrase “every contract . . . in restraint of trade” in section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, the Court ruled 
that mergers between railroad holding companies did qualify as interstate 
commerce.
37
  The particularly important opinion in this case was that of 
Justice Brewer, who provided a concurring fifth vote in support of 
enjoining the merger between the Great Northern Railway Company of 
Minnesota and the Northern Pacific Railway Company of Wisconsin.  The 
four Justices in the plurality believed that the Sherman Act should be 
construed literally and that “every contract, . . . in whatever form, of 
whatever nature, and whoever may be parties to it, . . . in restraint of trade” 
should be enjoined.
38
  Brewer, on the other hand, considered that the 
Sherman Act only reached “unreasonable” restraints of interstate 
commerce, but that this combination was unreasonable.
39
  The dissenters, 
led by Justice Holmes, essentially agreed with Brewer that the 
“reasonableness” standard should be applied, but disagreed with the 
outcome.  Holmes argued that the Sherman Act was of a “very sweeping 
and general character,” and only covered restraints on trade that would be 
invalid at common law.
40
  The theory of Brewer and the dissenters finally 
prevailed seven years later in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in which 
the Court adopted the “rule of reason” approach to antitrust, whereby only 
“unreasonable” restraints on trade were prohibited.
41
 
The period between 1890 and 1911 thus laid the groundwork for a 
market-based approach to antitrust.  The courts would look at the effect of 
completed or proposed transactions on the market; they would not 
 
 35.  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899). 
 36.  Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398–99 (1905). 
 37.  N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 354 (1904). 
 38.  Id. at 331 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
 39.  Id. at 361. 
 40.  Id. at 402 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 41.  221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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automatically invalidate particular kinds of transactions.  This was not an 
inevitable result.  In Northern Securities, the Court could have adopted a 
formalistic approach, under which a combination through a holding 
company, rather than a direct combination of corporate interests, would be 
considered immune from attack under the antitrust laws.  But the lower 
court refused to do so, observing that “the law . . . looks always at the 
substance of things . . . rather than upon the particular devices or means by 
which [a transaction] has been accomplished,”
42
 and the Supreme Court 
agreed.
43
  The decisions in E.C. Knight and Addyston Pipe, predating 
Northern Securities, have been interpreted as encouraging corporations to 
enter into mergers rather than cartels:  Manufacturing was initially not 
covered by the Sherman Act, whereas price-fixing certainly was.
44
  But the 
weight of the evidence is against this assertion, and whatever truth there is 
in it,
45
 it was clear by 1911 that the Court was generally concerned not with 
the structure of transactions, but their substance.
46
 
The “rule of reason” approach to antitrust law held sway until about 
1940.  Soon after the Court endorsed this approach, Congress in 1914 
enacted the Clayton Act in order to “reach conduct that did not rise to the 
level of a Sherman Act violation.”
47
  The Clayton Act covers potentially 
anticompetitive behavior such as price discrimination,
48
 tying 
arrangements,
49
 stock acquisitions,
50
 and interlocking directorates.
51
  
Instead of regulating the market as a whole, like the Sherman Act, the 
 
 42.  United States v. N. Sec. Co., 120 F. 721, 726 (C.C. D. Minn. 1903). 
 43.  N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332 (1904). 
 44.  George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 
J.L. & ECON. 77, 86–89, 97 (1985); Tony Freyer, The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative 
Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880–1920, 74 
IOWA L. REV. 991, 1006–07 (1989). 
 45.  Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the 
Foundations of Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 85, 95 (2005). 
 46.  The case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. is an example of 
this.  The Dr. Miles Court struck down a vertical price maintenance agreement as against the 
rule of reason, noting that it was in “restrain[t of] trade” and “injurious to the public 
interest . . . .”  220 U.S. 373, 400, 409 (1911).  The Court applied the same logic that had 
animated its previous cases, such as Addyston Pipe, and did not place weight on the precise 
form of the restraint.  See, e.g., id. at 409 (“The complainant’s plan falls within the principle 
which condemns contracts of this class.  It, in effect, creates a combination for the prohibited 
purposes.”) (emphasis added). 
 47.  Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53; Milton 
Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 930, 945 (1962). 
 48.  15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). 
 49.  Id. § 14. 
 50.  Id. § 18. 
 51.  Id. § 19. 
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Clayton Act seeks to regulate specific conduct engaged in by corporate 
entities.
52
  In the future, for example, boards of competing corporations 
could not share directors, regardless of whether or not such sharing would 
be deemed reasonable by a court.
53
  The market-based approach of the 
Sherman Act, on the one hand, and the transaction- or firm-based approach 
of the Clayton Act, on the other, were complementary.  Indeed, the Clayton 
Act was designed to fill gaps in the Sherman Act’s system of market 
regulation.
54
 
Even though the “rule of reason” period is generally considered to last 
up to 1940 or well beyond, it quickly began to show cracks.
55
  In the 1927 
case of United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., the Court ruled that even 
though a suspect business practice—here, price-fixing—might pass muster 
under the rule of reason now, there was no guarantee that it would do so in 
the future.
56
  Therefore, in some situations, it might be necessary for the 
Court to hold that a certain practice was automatically illegal.  The Court 
held: 
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and 
business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.  
Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the 
absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price 
reasonable when fixed.  Agreements which create such potential 
power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or 
unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry 
whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as 
 
 52.  Not all of the Clayton Act was transaction-based.  For example, section 6 of the 
Act exempted labor unions from the scope of the act.  15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (“The labor of 
a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce . . . .”). 
 53.  A court must still determine that the corporations whose directors are being shared 
are competitors, which is not necessarily an easy analysis.  See Benjamin M. Gerber, 
Enabling Interlock Benefits While Preventing Anticompetitive Harm: Toward an Optimal 
Definition of Competitors Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 118 
(2007) (explaining that the ambiguity surrounding the definition of “competitors” results 
from infrequent litigation on the issue). 
 54.  The Senate Report on the Clayton Act stated that:  “It is not proposed by the bill or 
amendments to alter, amend, or change in any respect the original Sherman Antitrust Act of 
July 2, 1890.  The purpose is only to supplement that act and the other antitrust acts referred 
to in section 1 of the bill.”  S. REP. NO. 63-698, at 1 (1914).  The act was also intended to 
supplement various state laws.  See, e.g., H. REP. NO. 63-627, at 9 (1914) (listing state laws 
on price discrimination). 
 55.  Compare THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST 
LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 118–230 (4th ed. 2009) (describing the rule of reason period as 
lasting until 1940), with Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 263, 279–85 (describing the rule of reason period as a middle period lasting until 1965). 
 56.  273 U.S. 392, 396–97 (1927). 
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fixed . . . .
57
 
Trenton Potteries was an early harbinger of the “per se” period of 
antitrust enforcement.  The “per se” period is so called because, during this 
period, certain types of activity were ruled illegal in and of themselves.  
These activities included price-fixing (again),
58
 group boycotts,
59
 
geographic divisions of territory,
60
 and monopolization.
61
  However, not 
every potentially anticompetitive activity was considered per se illegal, and 
the Court had difficulty at times determining what should be per se illegal 
and what should not.
62
 
In doing so, courts sought to regulate the market by proscribing 
certain kinds of transactions.  Congress also took a transaction-based 
approach in its antitrust legislation.  The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 
prevented firms from escaping the requirements of the Clayton Act by 
acquiring all of the assets, rather than the stock, of another company.  This 
act, like the Clayton Act, sought to govern the behavior of corporations 
directly.
63
 
The “per se” period is usually considered to last until the 1970s, when 
the Court decided Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania.
64
  But, the courts did 
not wholly disregard the market-based approach to antitrust in this time.  
 
 57.  Id. at 397. 
 58.  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
 59.  Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 464 
(1941). 
 60.  Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951). 
 61.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 62.  See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (declaring 
that vertical territorial restrictions on resales imposed by a manufacturer on a distributor 
were per se illegal), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 
(1977). 
 63.  Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18).  The Celler-Kefauver Act closed the “assets loophole” of the 
Clayton Act:  Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as originally drafted, prevented one corporation 
from acquiring “the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another 
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to 
substantially lessen competition . . . .”  Antitrust Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730, 731.  As a result, 
it was possible for corporations instead to acquire all the assets of other corporations, and 
avoid the antitrust restriction.  The judiciary acquiesced in the executive’s interpretation and 
enforcement of Celler-Kefauver.  In United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., for example, the 
Court held that the acquisition by one Los Angeles grocery retailer of the assets of another 
L.A. grocery retailer violated Celler-Kefauver.  United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 
U.S. 270 (1966).  Justice Stewart dissented, writing that “[t]he sole consistency that I can 
find is that in litigation under [Celler-Kefauver] the Government always wins.”  Id. at 301 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 64.  433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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This period is also known for its focus on market structure,
65
 and courts 
would enjoin supposedly anticompetitive practices because the perpetrators 
possessed too much market power, rather than because there was strong 
evidence of anticompetitive conduct.
66
  The market-based and transaction-
based approaches of antitrust law thus complemented each other. 
And, to some extent, they bled into each other.  “Per se” rules became 
increasingly rare, as courts looked harder at whether certain practices really 
should be enjoined.  Often, courts would analyze the market effect of the 
allegedly anticompetitive practice before applying the per se rule to a 
practice that had already been held to be per se anticompetivie practice—
which thereby rendered the rule in effect not a per se rule at all.
67
  Courts 
also sought to adopt a more sophisticated approach than the “rule of 
reason” standard.  They frequently resorted to Robert Bork’s “consumer 
welfare” formulation, according to which the goal of antitrust law was to 
“improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so 
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”
68
 
About the time Bork introduced this famous principle, Congress 
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 
(HSR).
69
  This act came at the end of what has been termed a “Golden Age” 
of antitrust enforcement.
70
  One of the authors of HSR, Senator Phil Hart, 
sponsored the “Industrial Reorganization Act,” which would grant a 
regulatory tribunal the power to “deconcentrat[e]” specific industries.
71
  He 
proposed an amendment of the Sherman Act that would have prohibited 
 
 65.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 355–56 (2009) (explaining the market-based approach to antitrust 
law taken by the courts during the relevant time period). 
 66.   See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 448 (reversing judgment of lower court 
dismissing complaint of monopolistic practices). 
 67.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19 (1984) 
(explaining the evolving approach to the application of the per se rule).  In the same year as 
publishing the Article, Easterbrook successfully argued before the Supreme Court Jefferson 
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, where the Court declined to overturn its 
longstanding holding that tying arrangements were illegal per se, but modified its holding so 
that any inquiry into their “per se condemnation” must be based on a finding that there was 
market-forcing.  466 U.S. 2, 15–16 (1984).  As four concurring Justices pointed out, this 
was akin to analyzing tying arrangements under a rule of reason standard.  Id. at 34–35 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 68.  BORK, supra note 31, at 91; see also Stucke, supra note 27, at 574 (discussing the 
adoption of this standard by courts). 
 69.  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 
Stat. 1383 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 18a). 
 70.  Joe Sims & Deborah P. Harman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino 
on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to 
Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 872 (1997). 
 71.  Id. at 873. 
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monopoly possession, regardless of the manner of acquisition.
72
  
Nevertheless, HSR—as it was enacted—was only intended to make a 
modest change to the existing regime of federal antitrust regulation.  The 
act created a system of premerger review for the “very largest corporate 
mergers,”
73
 as well as giving states the right to sue for antitrust violations 
on behalf of their citizens,
74
 and granting the Department of Justice the 
power to undertake civil antitrust investigations.
75
  Insofar as HSR was 
intended to affect the market for corporate control, it has been described as 
“modest medicine for a modest problem.”
76
 
In sum, federal antitrust law has grown incrementally, and somewhat 
inconsistently, since the Sherman Act was passed over 120 years ago.  The 
courts have interpreted the Sherman Act to regulate the market as a whole, 
and as part of this regulation, they have also prohibited specific kinds of 
transactions by individual firms.  Congress has passed legislation with a 
focus on both the market and transactions.  With this foundation, I now 
move on to corporate law. 
 
B. The Path of Corporate Law 
Corporate law is, of course, older than federal antitrust law.  But 
before the nineteenth century, its most salient feature was its rarity.  
Corporations (in the modern commercial sense) were scarce, and those that 
did exist were chartered specially.
77
  As a result of these special charters, up 
to the 1830s a corporate charter was taken to imply a grant of monopoly 
privileges.
78
 
In the nineteenth century, the scope of corporate law became 
increasingly narrow, and focused on the rights and duties of managers and 
shareholders.  Competition and utility regulation were seen as separate 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 11 (1976). 
 74.  15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (2006). 
 75.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (2006). 
 76.  Sims & Harman, supra note 70, at 878. 
 77.  ROBERT E. WRIGHT, CORPORATION NATION: RISE AND DEMISE OF THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC JUGGERNAUT (forthcoming 2013); see also id. at ch. 8 (explaining that, with few 
exceptions, general incorporation laws were only enacted after the turn of the nineteenth 
century). 
 78.  This implied monopoly ended with the case of Proprietors of the Charles River 
Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren River Bridge, in which the Court held, “The 
complainants’ charter has been called a monopoly; but in no just sense can it be so 
considered.”  36 U.S. 420, 567 (1837).  See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 109–39 (1977) (discussing the state’s 
power to charter monopolies, with particular reference to Charles River Bridge). 
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areas outside corporate law’s purview.
79
  As corporate law became 
increasingly specialized, there was also a shift in the nature of the voting 
rights in the corporation.  Many corporations in the nineteenth century—in 
particular, turnpikes, canals, railroads, banks, and insurance companies—
had regressive voting structures, whereby the voting rights of large 
shareholders were limited.  The different explanations that have been 
offered for this phenomenon include a desire to grant small shareholders 
protection, which they would not otherwise have,
80
 and a “democratic” 
rather than “plutocratic” conception of the corporation.
81
 
These regressive voting structures largely died out by the twentieth 
century, and voting rights were henceforth more closely tied to economic 
rights.
82
  By this time, the idea that corporations should be managed 
primarily for the benefit of their shareholders (the “shareholder primacy” 
view) was commonplace.
83
  Nevertheless, many states have enacted 
“constituency statutes” providing that, either in the general course of 
business or in specific takeover situations, the corporation must be 
managed with general community interests in mind.
84
  Delaware has not, 
although the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that boards may take the 
interests of “the community generally” in determining whether to take 
defensive measures against takeover bids.
85
  But despite the “ad nauseam” 
debate on the proper goals of corporate governance,
86
 it is true to say that 
the corporation is managed primarily for the interests of its shareholders.
87
 
 
 79.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 126, 243 
(1991) (explaining the narrow scope of early corporate law). 
 80.  See Eric Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate 
Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century, 68 J. ECON. HISTORY 645, 660 (2008) (“One 
might imagine that the charters of firms in these industries were designed to attract the 
participation of small shareholders by offering them some measure of protection from 
dominance by large shareholders.”). 
 81.  Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the 
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1354–56 (2006). 
 82.  See, e.g., id. at 1358 (“The change came in the middle decades of the [nineteenth] 
century when the voting rights of American shareholders shifted decisively toward 
plutocracy.”). 
 83.  See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 
277 (1988) (discussing the origin of the view that corporations should be managed for the 
benefit of the shareholders). 
 84.  See generally Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow 
Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (1999) (surveying different corporate 
constituency statutes). 
 85.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 86.  See generally Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory 
of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 651 (2004) (outlining the debate 
over the proper goals of corporate governance). 
 87.  One piece of evidence for this is that universally, it is shareholders, and not any 
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We can thus describe American corporate law as consciously “firm-
focused,” in that it looks at the relations that bind the firm, rather than the 
corporation’s place in the wider market.
88
  Apart from in certain situations 
where community interests are implicated, corporate law is concerned with 
the relations of managers, shareholders, and (where relevant) creditors.  
Importantly, corporate law does not aim at regulating whole markets.  A 
court will scrutinize a transaction to determine whether the directors have 
breached a duty to shareholders, not to analyze its wider impact on the 
market for corporate control.
89
 
As noted, I take a broad view of corporate law in this Article, and 
include in it key features of securities regulation that affect corporate 
governance.  Federal securities regulation begins with the Securities Act of 
1933
90
 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
91
  The 1933 Act aimed to 
improve the market in securities by adopting disclosure-based reporting 
requirements for issuers of securities,
92
 and the 1934 Act regulates the 
secondary trading of those securities.
93
  For the purposes of this Article, the 
key piece of securities regulation that I will consider as corporate law is the 
Williams Act of 1968, which regulates the tender offer process.
94
  The 
Williams Act was the congressional response to coercive tender offers, 
 
other group, who have the power to elect directors. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.03(c) (2010) (providing that directors are elected at the annual shareholders’ meeting).  
Although this may be taken for granted in the United States, other countries permit 
nonshareholder constituencies to be involved in electing directors and board members.  See, 
e.g., Ángel R. Orquendo, Breaking on Through to the Other Side: Understanding 
Continental European Corporate Governance, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 975, 980–81 
(2001) (discussing the structure of German boards). 
 88.  In describing American corporate law as “firm-focused,” I do not mean to argue 
that the managers of a corporation owe duties to the corporation, rather than the 
shareholders.  In this context, I am contrasting corporate law’s focus on the corporation 
alone with the possibility that it might look to the broader market. 
 89.  In this regard, American corporate law may be contrasted with British corporate 
law, which appears more interested in maintaining a fluid market in corporate control.  For 
example, litigation in U.K. hostile takeovers is very rare, and the cost of a hostile bid is 
much cheaper.  See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1727, 1745-52 (2007) (contrasting the focuses of American corporate law with 
those of British corporate law). 
 90.  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2006). 
 91.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
 92.  See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A], 
at 22 (rev. 5th ed. 2006) (“The theory behind [the regulatory framework of the Securities 
Act] is that investors are adequately protected if all relevant aspects of the securities being 
marketed are fully and fairly disclosed.”). 
 93.  See id. § 1.2[3][A], at 23 (“The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is directed at 
regulating all aspects of public trading of securities.”). 
 94.  Williams Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2006). 
WALTER - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2013  4:23 PM 
2013] ANTITRUST AND CORPORATE LAW 769 
 
under which offerors were able to force shareholders into rushing to tender, 
sometimes on the basis of misinformation.
95
  Although the Act has had a 
major impact on the market for corporate control, it has a transaction-based 
approach:  It governs the process by which firms may make and accept 
tender offers.  Apart from setting out the rules for tender offers, the Act 
sought to be “neutral” and not to favor bidders or target shareholders.
96
  
Broadly conceived, corporate law thus has a transaction- or firm-based 
approach. 
 
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CORPORATE LAW AND ANTITRUST LAW 
A. The Nature of the Conflict 
Antitrust law, as we have seen, seeks to regulate the market, and 
blends a transaction-focused approach with a market-oriented approach.  
Certain transaction-based elements of antitrust law have the potential to 
clash with corporate law, whose firm-based approach governs whether 
corporations are permitted to engage in particular transactions, and does not 
regulate the market as a whole.  It is not hard to see the potential for tension 
between corporate and antitrust law.  To use a basic example of 
anticompetitive behavior that antitrust law prohibits, a firm may be able to 
obtain higher profits if it engages in horizontal price-fixing with another 
firm.  These higher profits may lead to higher returns to shareholders, and 
therefore, corporate directors and officers might be tempted to engage in it.  
But antitrust law enjoins such price-fixing per se.
97
  The interests of the 
public at large trump the interests of the shareholders of the firm.
98
   
There could, of course, be a perfect overlap between the class of 
shareholders and class of customers of a firm.
99
  In such a situation, 
corporate law and antitrust law could not be in conflict:  Maximizing 
shareholder value would be no different from maximizing “consumer 
welfare,” for all the consumers would be shareholders.  In the market for 
 
 95.  William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the 
Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 241, 249–53 (1990) (explaining the 
purpose of the Williams Act was to eliminate tender offer abuses). 
 96.  Id. at 252. 
 97.  See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“Agreements 
which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or 
unlawful restraints . . . .”). 
 98.  See id. (“[T]he public interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and 
price control by the maintenance of competition.”) (emphasis added). 
 99.  This was the historical operation of some corporations, such as insurance 
companies founded to serve their local market. 
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corporate control, the consumers whose “welfare” is to be “maximized” are 
shareholders.  Insofar as this market is concerned, we should expect 
corporate and antitrust law to be well-aligned. 
There are reasons to be skeptical about this alignment.  Most corporate 
law, with the exception of securities regulation, is state law.  The most 
important antitrust legislation, on the other hand, is federal law.  Therefore, 
two different sets of institutions—state and federal—are responsible for 
producing law that maximizes shareholder value.  If only one of these errs, 
or has a different notion of what constitutes “consumer welfare” or 
“shareholder value,” antitrust law and corporate law could be in conflict.  
Furthermore, when antitrust law seeks to regulate at the level of the firm—
as opposed to the market—there is a higher risk of a conflict with corporate 
law, which also regulates firms. 
To be sure, conflicts are not necessarily problematic.  Antitrust law 
can conflict with many areas of law, and courts can resolve these tensions.  
The doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy is one such example.  Until 
1984, it was theoretically possible for a parent corporation to be held liable 
for conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiary.
100
  The effect of this was 
to encourage corporations to merge subsidiaries into themselves and 
operate them as divisions.  Antitrust law thus took a firm-based approach 
that conflicted squarely with the firm-based approach of corporate law:  
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine affected the structure of 
corporations, and made it less desirable for a parent company to spin out a 
division, as it might be held liable for conspiracy.
101
  But, in 1984, the 
Supreme Court repudiated the doctrine, stating that “the coordinated 
activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that 
of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”
102
  Corporate 
law is still free to treat parents and subsidiaries as being able to conspire 
with one another, which is fitting, as they have “presumptively separate 
legal dignities.”
103
  Thus, corporate law has free rein, without interference 
from antitrust law. 
Another conflict that has been resolved—at least partially—is the use 
of antitrust derivative suits to obstruct takeovers.
104
  The idea is simple:  If 
 
 100.  See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (finding the very 
idea of an agreement between a parent and subsidiary to be meaningless). 
 101.  See Phillip Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451, 
453–54 (1983) (discussing the history of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine). 
 102.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. 
 103.  Allied Capital Corp. v. G-C Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1039 (Del. Ch. 
2006).  But see In re Transamerica Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1039-N, 2006 WL 587846, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2006) (holding “the general principle that a corporate parent and its 
wholly-owned subsidiary cannot conspire together to be controlling”). 
 104.  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
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the target company is in the same business as the acquirer, it may seek to 
enjoin the takeover on the grounds that the takeover will reduce 
competition in the business.  The target may demand injunctive relief under 
section 16 of the Clayton Act because the merger would violate section 7 of 
the Act.
105
  This strategy is of most use in the case of horizontal mergers, 
though it can also be used in instances of vertical integration.  Such actions 
are anomalous, because what they allow, in effect, is for the company to 
assert rights that would traditionally belong to the persons that are harmed 
by the antitrust violation.
106
  The target company and its shareholders are 
not victims of the antitrust injury; rather, the target’s shareholders profit by 
the alleged violation, assuming that the acquiring company pays a premium 
for the merger.  Therefore, the purpose of antitrust derivative suits in such a 
situation is solely to obstruct a takeover, not to remedy a harm suffered by 
the plaintiff.  Because of the lack of “antitrust standing” in such a situation, 
many courts have blocked the use of such actions, which has resolved the 
conflict.
107
 
 
B. Resolving Conflicts Between Corporate and Antitrust Law 
Nevertheless, the potential for conflicts between antitrust law and 
corporate law remains.  These conflicts are inefficient and socially 
wasteful:  Directors and managers of organizations are forced to try to 
abide by contradictory rules.  This Article proposes a way of resolving 
these conflicts:  Antitrust law should only step in to solve a problem of 
competition in the market for corporate control when the existing modes of 
 
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1982) (detailing potential defensive strategies in the case of 
a takeover). 
 105.  15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 26 (2006).  Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that “[n]o 
person . . . shall acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . 
where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly.”  15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 106.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 104, at 1156; cf. supra note 74 and 
accompanying text (noting the provision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act that gave states 
standing to sue). 
 107.  Despite the criticism of such suits, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 104, the 
Second Circuit permitted such an action to proceed in Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. 
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989).  The court noted that the antitrust laws were 
enacted for the “protection of competition, not competitors,” and thus permitted the suit to 
proceed.  Consolidated Gold Fields PLC, 871 F.2d at 257 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).  Other courts have expressly criticized this result.  
See, e.g., Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Med. Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(declining to follow Gold Fields and instead “adher[ing] to the line of cases . . . that require 
antitrust injury” in order to possess standing to sue for injunctive relief). 
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governance for that market—state corporate law, together with federal 
securities regulation—are incapable of resolving the problem on their own. 
This principle is, in part, common sense.  Having two bodies of law 
regulate one area increases the risk of inconsistent regulatory schemes and 
modes of governance, and therefore, this should be avoided.  Courts and 
scholars may find ways of resolving these inconsistencies—for example, 
by holding that one body of law preempts the other.
108
  Nevertheless, it is 
undoubtedly true that overlapping regulatory schemes creates the 
possibility of inconsistent regulation. 
But the principle also has a broader policy foundation, which is the 
view that the current system of state corporate law, supported by federal 
securities regulation, is successful.  Although there is certainly a role for 
federal regulation in corporate law, as under the current system, we should 
be wary before increasing federal oversight of the market for corporate 
control when state systems of corporate governance have historically been 
successful.
109
  The acceptance by the judiciary of the view that corporate 
governance should be left to the states was most definitively expressed in 
1977 in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, where the Court ruled that a 
federal action, under Rule 10b-5, could not be used to obtain redress for an 
alleged breach of corporate law fiduciary duty.
110
  The Court noted that 
permitting Rule 10b-5 to be used in this way “would . . . bring within the 
Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state 
regulation.”
111
  The D.C. Circuit echoed this reasoning in the 1990 case of 
Business Roundtable v. SEC, where the court struck down a new corporate 
voting regulation on the grounds that it exceeded the SEC’s authority under 
the Exchange Act and trespassed on “a part of corporate governance 
traditionally left to the states.”
112
  Congress likely does have the power to 
regulate every aspect of corporate governance, under the Commerce 
 
 108.  See, e.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (finding 
that securities law precluded the application of antitrust law in a suit concerning initial 
public offerings); Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding 
that the antitrust laws were inconsistent with the securities law in a takeover case); Dahl v. 
Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that securities 
law does not preempt antitrust law in going private transactions); Piraino, supra note 11, at 
992 (arguing that Finnegan is no longer good law after Credit Suisse). 
 109.  In fact, some scholars have argued that there need not even be a role for federal 
securities regulation.  See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2401–12 (1998) (suggesting that 
federal securities laws be made optional).  For this Article, I simply suggest that there is 
generally no further need for federal intervention in the market for corporate control in the 
form of antitrust enforcement. 
 110.  430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 111.  Id. at 479. 
 112.  905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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Clause, but it has chosen not to.  In the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, for example, Congress sought to prevent 
shareholders from using state courts to bring securities class actions.
113
  At 
the same time, however, it created a carve-out for claims that are based on 
state law, and permitted these actions to continue in state courts.
114
  And 
even in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Congress exempted 
corporate lawsuits from the scope of the law.
115
 
As a normative matter, the federalist structure of corporate law is 
praised by some, though not all, academics.  Scholars such as William Cary 
and Lucian Bebchuk have argued that state corporate law is a “race to the 
bottom,” with each state seeking to enact laws that are more and more pro-
management in order to attract companies to their state.
116
  According to 
this theory, all that can stop the continued deterioration in the quality of the 
internal governance of corporations is federal intervention.  This argument 
has been rebutted by others who believe that state corporate law is, if 
anything, a race (or “leisurely walk”) to the top, and that states compete to 
improve their laws, not weaken them.
117
  This theory relies on the fact that 
shareholders can choose where to incorporate new companies, and can 
oblige a company to reincorporate in a different state if they would prefer it 
to be governed by a different legal regime. 
It is clear that the current system of corporate law provides meaningful 
choice to shareholders.  Delaware provides a system of corporate 
governance based on what one scholar has called “director primacy”:  The 
directors manage the corporation for the benefit of the shareholders.
118
  
North Dakota has taken (with limited success) the opposite approach, 
 
 113.  Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(2)-(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998). 
 114.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(1)(B), 78bb(f)(1) (2006) (permitting certain state law claims 
to continue in state courts). 
 115.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(B) (2006) (exempting claims that relate to the internal 
affairs or governance of corporations). 
 116.  See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (describing the deterioration of corporate law in 
Delaware); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (analyzing the 
nature of state charter competition). 
 117.  The original proponent of this theory was Professor (and now Judge) Ralph Winter 
in his article, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).  His thesis was expanded upon and strengthened by Roberta 
Romano.  ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); see also 
Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1526, 1529 (1989) (re-characterizing the “race to the top” as a “leisurely walk”). 
 118.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). 
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adopting a “shareholder-centric” corporation law.
119
  Nevada has followed 
Delaware’s director-centered approach, and has adopted a statute that 
significantly reduces the fiduciary duties owed by the directors of a firm to 
its shareholders.
120
  And the arguments in favor of federalism in corporate 
law have attracted considerable support over the last two decades, even 
despite corporate fiascos such as the Enron debacle, which led to the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
121
  Outside of the United States, 
another group of jurisdictions that is able to mimic the American approach–
the European Union–has begun to do so.
122
  Scholars studying the European 
market have come to assume the superiority of competitive federalism,
123
 
business groups have lobbied for it,
124
 and the European Commission has 
even studied the adoption of a regulation that would enshrine competitive 
 
 119.  Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad 
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24 n.116 (2011). 
 120.  Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate 
Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165 (2012) (detailing Nevada’s approach to corporate law). 
 121.  For a summary of the debate, see Fenner Stewart, Jr., The Place of Corporate 
Lawmaking in American Society, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 147, 155–65 (2010). 
 122.  The European progression toward an American system of competition for charters 
has been slow, but significant.  In 1999, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that a 
company that had incorporated itself in a jurisdiction in order to take advantage of that 
jurisdiction’s low share capital requirements could not be prevented from carrying on all its 
business in another jurisdiction.  Case C-212/97, Centros v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
1999, E.C.R. I-1484.  This reasoning was extended in Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. 
Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002, E.C.R. I-9943, which 
held that a corporation incorporated in one jurisdiction could not be denied access to the 
courts of another jurisdiction that was its only possible forum, and in Case C-167/01, Kamer 
van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd, 2003, E.C.R. I-10195, 
which held that a foreign corporation could not be subjected to different requirements from 
domestic corporations.  The “real seat” theory is still permitted under European law, which 
acts as a restraint on a fluid market for charters.  Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és 
Szolgáltató bt, 2008, E.C.R. I-09641.  However, more and more states are abandoning the 
“real seat” theory in favor of the registration theory, and so it is possible that the European 
market for incorporations may become fluid without any legislative or judicial action.  See 
Stefano Lombardo, Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the EU after Cartesio, 10 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 627, 637 (2009) (detailing the role of the registration theory in the 
European market). 
 123.  Lombardo, supra note 122 (arguing that shareholders should be able to change 
easily the seats of incorporation of their companies); Andrzej W. Wiśniewski & Adam 
Opalski, Companies’ Freedom of Establishment after the ECJ Cartesio Judgment, 10 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 595, 621 (2009) (“[Cross-border conversion of corporate form] is a 
useful supplement to the right to move their centre of administration, allowing them to more 
freely select the most convenient legal system and stimulating competition between Member 
States’ company law systems.”). 
 124.  See EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INST., REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP 
OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN 
EUROPE (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.ecgi.org/publications/documents/report_e 
n.pdf (urging the Commission to propose legal changes to promote competitive federalism). 
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federalism in European law.
125
 
The conscious decision that the courts and Congress have made that 
corporate governance should be the domain of the states, and the 
advantages of that system from a policy perspective, provide support for 
the notion that antitrust law should be confined to correcting problems in 
the market for corporate control that state corporate law cannot fix.  Where 
state corporate law, working in conjunction with federal securities law, 
cannot fix a problem, antitrust law should step in.  This is largely how the 
system operates.  I return to the example at the beginning of this Part—that 
of a corporation engaging in horizontal price-fixing.
126
  Corporate law has 
nothing to say about horizontal price-fixing.  It would be difficult for 
corporate law, which focuses on wealth maximization, to say anything 
about this.  In theory, the directors and officers of a firm, given the 
opportunity, might seek to engage in such conduct in order to maximize 
shareholder value.  But antitrust law prohibits this anticompetitive 
conduct.
127
  Corporate law, relying on antitrust law, addresses this issue 
indirectly:  A willful breach of antitrust law would also constitute a breach 
of a director’s duty of loyalty in corporate law.
128
  Thus, corporate law 
effectively yields to antitrust law. 
But when there is a problem that corporate law can solve, either on its 
own or in conjunction with federal securities law, antitrust law need not be 
involved.  The next Part discusses how corporate law manages to resolve 
issues in the market for corporate control. 
 
III. CORPORATE LAW RESOLVING ISSUES ON ITS OWN 
I now move to three areas where it has been suggested that the market 
for corporate control is anticompetitive, and where it has been suggested 
that federal antitrust law should step in to restore competition.  Currently, 
federal antitrust law does not operate in these areas.  I argue that this is 
 
 125.  See COMM’N OF EUROPEAN CMTYS., IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE DIRECTIVE ON THE 
CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER OF REGISTERED OFFICE (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/in 
ternal_market/company/docs/shareholders/ia_transfer_122007_part1_en.pdf (analyzing the 
potential impact of cross-border transfer regulation). 
 126.  See supra text accompanying notes 97–98. 
 127.  United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (prohibiting horizontal 
price-fixing). 
 128.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 652 (2010) (“[C]ourts . . . have had little 
difficulty in concluding that directors breach their fiduciary duty when they knowingly 
cause the corporation to violate the law and are responsible for any harm suffered by the 
corporation as a result.”). 
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desirable:  There is no need for federal antitrust law to do so.  Thus, federal 
antitrust law and corporate law are working together as they should. 
 
A. Tender Offers: Collusion Between Buyers 
In his seminal 1989 article, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate 
Control, Edward Rock argued that collusion in hostile tender offers should 
be scrutinized under the antitrust laws in the same way as collusion in any 
other market.
129
  The article was triggered by 1980s bidding battles in 
which private equity firms had agreed to bid jointly for targets, rather than 
against each other.
130
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit endorsed this behavior in the 1985 case, Kalmanovitz v. G. 
Heileman Brewing Co.
131
  In Kalmanovitz, two bidders for the Pabst 
Brewing Company initially competed against each other to gain control of 
the company, but then ceased competition and agreed to bid with each 
other and divide the company’s assets.
132
  The Third Circuit held that 
bidders for a company were permitted to collude in a tender offer auction, 
since such behavior did not implicate “trade or commerce,” and so was not 
covered by the Sherman Act.
133
 
The Rock article noted that if the object of the bidding in Kalmanovitz 
was not corporate stock, but goods or services, such collusion would be 
illegal.
134
  This argument has been taken up more recently in an article by 
another scholar and practitioner, Thomas Piraino, who has claimed that 
collusion by bidders in “going private” transactions has lost shareholders 
billions of dollars in the last few years.
135
  Piraino’s focus is on change-of-
control transactions in the private equity business:  He argues that the small 
number of firms in the industry has allowed private equity houses to “take 
turns” in bidding for companies and thus reduce the price that they would 
pay.
136
  As an alternative to taking turns, the private equity houses may also 
form consortiums—or “clubs”—to bid for a target.  This behavior prevents 
the target from enjoying the benefit of multiple, competitive, bids.
137
 
The argument concerning collusion in tender offers has two main 
 
 129.  Rock, Corporate Control, supra note 10. 
 130.  Id. at 1368, 1402, 1411. 
 131.  Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 132.  Id. at 157. 
 133.  Id. at 156. 
 134.  Rock, Corporate Control, supra note 10. 
 135.  Piraino, supra note 11. 
 136.  Id. at 973. 
 137.  Id. at 978. 
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prongs.  First, it is claimed that bidders in tender offers explicitly collude 
and refuse to compete against each other.
138
  This collusion can be seen as a 
form of horizontal price-fixing, which is illegal per se.
139
  Second, it is 
claimed that implicit collusion between private equity firms is rife:  Even if 
private equity bidders do not agree explicitly to collude in a bid, they are 
able to signal to each other that they do not wish to bid against each 
other.
140
  Such signaling is not illegal per se, but would still be illegal if it 
had an anticompetitive effect.
141
  Both implicit and explicit collusion are at 
issue in the ongoing litigation in federal district court, Dahl v. Bain Capital, 
on alleged collusion between private equity firms in club deals.
142
 
One proposed remedy to these perceived problems—and the remedy 
sought in the lawsuit—is more stringent application of the federal antitrust 
laws.  According to this thinking, state corporate law and federal securities 
laws are not equal to the task of correcting this anticompetitive behavior.  
Under state corporate law, managers have a fiduciary duty to obtain the 
best possible price for a corporation’s stock when a sale is inevitable.
143
  
But, managers “can avoid the application of state fiduciary laws entirely 
simply by proving that they made their best efforts to obtain the highest 
available price in a change-of-control transaction.”
144
  Therefore, if private 
equity firms collude in bidding, shareholders have no recourse against 
management for failing to obtain a better price; managers cannot prevent 
bidders from colluding, and their best efforts may come to naught.  The 
federal securities laws, on the other hand, force bidders to disclose any 
agreements to bid jointly for a company, but do not prohibit joint bidding 
arrangements.
145
  They therefore provide no remedy against collusive 
 
 138.  Piraino, supra note 11, at 1001–04. 
 139.  See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“The aim 
and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of 
competition.”). 
 140.  Piraino, supra note 11, at 1004–11. 
 141.  United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); see also LAWRENCE A. 
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 240–
41 (2000) (stating that Gypsum’s analysis shows how price information exchanges should be 
subject to the conventional antitrust analysis). 
 142.  E.g., Third Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 40–47, Dahl v. Bain Capital 
Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 07-12388-EFH), available at 
2008 WL 5679238 (describing defendants’ scheme to collude, and citing the leveraged 
buyouts of SunGard and Neiman Marcus Group as recent examples of defendants’ collusive 
behavior). 
 143.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 
1986). 
 144.  Piraino, supra note 11, at 989; see, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 
235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“No court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that goal [of 
getting the best price in a sale].”). 
 145.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2012); see also Piraino, supra note 11, at 990 (citing 
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behavior, even if this behavior would be illegal under the Sherman Act.
146
 
The argument above is not ironclad.  The threshold problem is that it 
is not clear that shareholders are being harmed through such allegedly 
anticompetitive practices.  One study that compared private deals and 
public deals between 1990 and 2005 concluded that target company 
shareholders received an acquisition premium that was forty-three percent 
higher if a public firm rather than a private firm made the acquisition, and 
fifty-five percent higher if a public firm rather than a private equity firm 
makes the acquisition.
147
  But the conclusion drawn by the study 
researchers was that public firms are overpaying—not that private equity 
firms are underpaying.
148
  The explanation for this overpayment was that 
publicly owned companies have diffuse ownership, and that managers thus 
have less incentive to ensure that they do not overpay for targets.
149
  Other 
research has shown that private equity firms are prone to overpaying for 
firms as well as for underpaying for them, and also that private equity 
buyouts create permanent economic value, which would help explain why 
private equity investors can gain high returns on capital.
150
 
But this threshold issue is not fatal for the argument that the market 
for control does not suffer a problem of competition.  Even if private equity 
on balance adds significant value to firms, and target shareholders receive 
fair prices for their stock, instances of collusion that reduce target 
shareholder return in individual cases should still not be tolerated.  For 
example, the plaintiffs in the ongoing Dahl litigation in Massachusetts 
 
Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he SEC . . . has ‘chosen 
not to prohibit agreements between rival bidders as fraudulent or manipulative practices 
once shareholders are properly informed of them.’”)). 
 146.  Piraino, supra note 11, at 990. 
 147.  Leonce Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to 
Public Acquirers? 1, 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13061, 2007); 
Piraino, supra note 11, at 987 n. 111. 
 148.  Bargeron et al., supra note 147, at 23. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 121, 135 (2009) (“[I]t seems likely that at times in the boom-and-bust cycle, 
private equity firms have overpaid in their leveraged buyouts and experienced losses.”).  
Kaplan and Strömberg do acknowledge the Bargeron paper and other research that show 
that “there is some evidence that private equity funds are able to acquire firms more cheaply 
than other bidders.”  Id.  However, they note that there are various possible explanations for 
this:  Private equity firms may be exceptionally skillful negotiators, and private equity firms 
are better than public firms are timing the market well, both on entering and exiting their 
investment.  These explanations are plausible, given that the business model of private 
equity is to some extent predicated upon private equity fund managers being good 
bargainers and knowing how to time the market.  See also id. at 143 (“[P]rivate equity 
creates economic value . . . . “). 
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claim to identify up to thirty-six such transactions.
151
  And there are 
certainly instances where bidders appear to have managed to collude to 
avoid paying the price that they would pay if bidding against each other in 
a competitive auction process.
152
  If shareholders are being harmed, then 
corporate law and securities law have failed, and antitrust law may be the 
only solution to prevent further harms. 
But it is not inevitable that shareholders would be harmed by any of 
the three practices that are condemned, namely, express collusion, tacit 
collusion, and use of consortia.  In theory, shareholders may be harmed by 
receiving an offer price from a collusive bid that is lower than the price that 
they would receive if the target were the subject of a competitive bidding 
process.  But shareholders retain the right to approve, or vote against, the 
sale of the company.  In a publicly owned corporation without a majority 
shareholder, there is no single owner who can force a sale.
153
  If 
shareholders know that one bidder is refusing to compete with another 
bidder, or that two bidders have decided to form a consortium, the 
shareholders have no obligation to sell the corporation at all, and they 
might well choose not to.  As noted above, the federal securities regulations 
mandate disclosure of such bidding agreements;
154
 shareholders will be able 
to make an informed choice. 
This “informed choice” is not idle fantasy.  Shareholders are, by and 
large, not the uninformed and powerless individuals of the Berle and 
Means corporation.
155
  Instead, individuals choose generally to invest 
through intermediaries—institutional investors such as mutual funds and 
pension funds.
156
  These institutional investors, by contrast, can agitate to 
 
 151.  Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 152.  Piraino, supra note 11, at 1003–04. 
 153.  If there is a majority shareholder, that shareholder will always be able to force a 
sale of the entire company, because it will be able to purchase the shares of the minority 
through a “squeeze-out.”  Since Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that there was no business purpose requirement for such a transaction.  457 A.2d 701 (Del. 
1983). 
 154.  See supra note 145. 
 155.  The “Berle and Means corporation” denotes a corporation whose stock is diffusely 
owned by individuals.  See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 117 (1932).  As a result of this diffuse ownership, all 
economic power rests in the hands of the management.  See, e.g., id. at 124 (“[I]t is 
therefore evident that we are dealing not only with distinct but often with opposing groups, 
ownership on the one side, control on the other—a control which tends to move further and 
further away from ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a 
management capable of perpetuating its own position.”). 
 156.  See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 
101, 114 (1979); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? 
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of 
Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2007). 
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ensure that they achieve the best possible return on their investment.  They 
can either research and study stocks themselves, or they can canvass an 
opinion from professional advisors who will tell them whether an offer 
should be accepted or not.
157
  Delaware law places such faith in 
shareholders’ ability to decide what is in their best interests that 
conditioning an “interested” transaction on the approval of a group of 
shareholders may help insulate that transaction from the most rigorous 
form of judicial scrutiny.
158
 
The ability of shareholders to refuse to sell their stock does not, on its 
own, eliminate all harms that may arise from collusion between bidders.
159
  
For example, shareholders may note that the offer they receive from the 
colluding bidders is still higher than the pre-bid price of their stock, and 
therefore choose to sell, even though the price they receive is not as high as 
it would be if there had been no collusion between bidders.  The harm to 
shareholders in this case is not receiving the premium that they would have 
obtained had there been no collusion. 
Nevertheless, it appears that corporate law already has a remedy for 
this problem.  Under the Revlon doctrine, a corporation’s board must make 
an effort to obtain the highest possible price for the corporation’s shares, 
when a change of control is inevitable.
160
  If the board, or its financial 
advisor, believes that a club deal will depress the price obtained for the 
shares, the board may choose not to permit such deals.
161
  The management 
may also prevent bidders from sharing information more generally.
162
  If 
shareholders who are faced with a deal believe that the management and 
directors have improperly permitted collusion between bidders, and have 
 
 157.  Strine, supra note 156, at 8; see also Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of 
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1874 (2008) (describing the role 
of Institutional Shareholder Services in advising institutional investors how they should 
vote). 
 158.  See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 643–44 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (advocating a standard of review for “going private” mergers whereby, if the deal was 
negotiated by an independent special committee and conditioned on the approval of a 
majority of the disinterested shareholders, the transaction would be reviewed under the 
deferential “business judgment” rule). 
 159.  As will be discussed below, see infra section II.B, this remedy has itself been 
attacked on the grounds that it raises antitrust problems:  Shareholders are colluding with 
each other and distorting the market.  I argue below that such a remedy would be 
procompetitive, not anticompetitive, and so presents no problems of antitrust law. 
 160.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 
1986). 
 161.  See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 821 (2011) 
(discussing a “no teaming” provision that allowed the board to “determine whether any 
bidders would be allowed to work together on a joint bid”). 
 162.  E.g., id. 
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not obtained the best price, they can sue under Revlon for equitable relief, 
and may later seek damages.
163
  They may also sue the allegedly collusive 
bidders for aiding and abetting the directors’ purported breach of fiduciary 
duty.
164
  Therefore, corporate law seems to have a mechanism to prevent, 
and remedy, any harm shareholders may suffer.  To be sure, antitrust law 
can provide a strong deterrent, including triple damages and criminal 
liability.
165
  But, corporate law is not without its own remedy. 
The case of tacit collusion, on the other hand, is more problematic.  In 
such cases, shareholders are not given all the information they need to 
decide whether or not to accept the bid.  Furthermore, even if management 
seeks to prevent bidders from communicating with each other, the bidders 
may disregard such instructions.  But, such behavior is already a breach of 
the federal securities laws:  Information about the collusion is not being 
disclosed to shareholders.
166
  Shareholders possess a private right of action 
for a failure to disclose such information, and of course the SEC can 
enforce the securities law also.
167
  Therefore, there does not seem to be any 
need for federal antitrust law to make any special provision to deal with 
tender offers. 
 
B. Tender Offers: Collusion Between Sellers 
Tender offers have also been criticized on antitrust grounds because of 
the potential for collusion between sellers.  In a tender offer, the bidder 
seeks to gain more than fifty percent of the shares of the target company; 
once this is done, the bidder will be able to buy the remainder of the shares, 
whether or not the sellers agree.
168
  This has the potential to create a 
“shareholders’ dilemma.”
169
  If all the shareholders cooperate with each 
 
 163.  See, e.g., In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (discussing injunctive relief and damages under Revlon). 
 164.  See, e.g., Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 836-37 (noting that a bidder may be liable for 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by the board). 
 165.  E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (providing for criminal liability for cartelization); id. § 
15(a) (2006) (providing for triple damages for violations of the antitrust laws). 
 166.  Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2006). 
 167.  See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 92, § 11.10, at 436-39 (discussing private rights of 
action under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 168.  The bidder may do this in two ways. If the bidder has fifty percent of the stock of 
the company that it wishes to acquire, it can merge the target company into a wholly-owned 
subsidiary. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2013).  If the bidder has over ninety percent of the 
stock that it wishes to acquire, it may simply “freeze out” the minority shareholders, in 
return for cash payments.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2013). 
 169.  See David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 184–91 (1986) (discussing tender offers, and noting how they differ 
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other, they collectively will be able to get a higher price than if they do not 
cooperate.  But it is tempting for shareholders not to cooperate.  Some of 
them may choose to sell their shares before an agreement is reached; if the 
bidder obtains a stake of over fifty percent, it may be able to pick up the 
remainder at a lower price.
170
  And some shareholders may renege from the 
agreement at the last moment by refusing to tender their shares; they may 
be able to extract a higher price than their fellow shareholders. 
Three mechanisms prohibit such behavior and “solve” the dilemma. 
The first is the Williams Act, which regulates tender offers.
171
  Under the 
Williams Act, it is not possible for a bidder to make incremental tender 
offers by first offering a low price, at which some shareholders tender their 
shares, and then offering a higher price, at which more shareholders tender, 
until the bidder has acquired the total number required.  Instead, the bidder 
must offer the later, higher price to all bidders.
172
 
The second mechanism is corporate law, which has set down 
standards for tender offers.  If a bidder that owns more than fifty percent of 
the stock of a company wishes to acquire the remainder that it does not 
own via a tender offer and then a “freeze-out,” it must agree to pay in the 
freeze-out the same price that it offered in the tender offer.
173
  On the other 
hand, if a non-controlling shareholder launches a tender offer, gains over 
fifty percent of the target, and then uses a merger to take full control, the 
second stage of the transaction is reviewed under an “entire fairness” 
standard, which ensures that those shareholders who do not tender their 
shares are paid a fair price.
174
 
 
from typical prisoner’s dilemmas). 
 170.  See id. at 163 n.41 (hypothesizing a world without state appraisal statutes, in which 
coercive tender offer structures could induce a shareholder to tender where he or she would 
not otherwise, in order to maximize the minimum amount the shareholder will receive). 
 171.  Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (adding new sections 13(d), 13(e) 
and 14(d)-(f) (1968) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (2012)). 
 172.  15 U.S.C § 78n(d)(7) (2006).  The Williams Act also mandates a minimum 
offering time for a tender offer, which makes it possible for competitors to challenge the 
offer.  Unlawful Tender Offer Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2012); Leebron, supra 
note 169, at 185 n.111. 
 173.  See In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(holding that a controlling shareholder’s tender offer for the company’s remaining shares is 
only considered non-coercive if the shareholder agrees to “freeze out” the non-tendering 
shareholders at the same price once it obtains more than 90% of the shares). 
 174.  See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (holding 
that “entire fairness” is the appropriate standard in a merger consummated by a controlling 
shareholder).  The entire fairness standard implicates both “fair dealing and fair price.”  Id. 
at 1115 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)).  Of these two, 
fair price is generally the more important one.  See, e.g., Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., 
P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 311 (Del. Ch. 2006) (noting that the requirement of 
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The third mechanism is the “poison pill,” which effectively forces a 
bidder to negotiate directly with management rather than directly with 
shareholders.  The poison pill thus can be seen as correcting an anomaly in 
Delaware corporation law under which merger transactions, which lead to a 
change of control, require board approval, but tender offers do not.
175
  
Although there are many forms of pills, the most common permit 
management to issue new securities if a bidder reaches a certain ownership 
stake in the target, or grant the target shareholders the right to buy shares in 
the acquiring company.
176
  This makes it very expensive, or impossible, for 
a bidder to take over a company with a pill without the approval of the 
management, who speak for all the shareholders.
177
 
These three mechanisms have the effect of solving the shareholder’s 
dilemma.  Instead of competing with each other, shareholders are forced to 
cooperate with each other.  This behavior, however, might be illegal in 
other contexts; as noted above, if the good being sold was not stock but 
widgets, such collusive behavior would be prohibited by the Sherman 
Act.
178
  Collusion between shareholders in responding to tender offers is, it 
has been claimed, “deeply problematic from the antitrust perspective,” and 
corporate law appears to be in conflict with antitrust law.
179
 
Various arguments have been put forward in support of this 
proposition, and I shall take the two most salient.
180
  First, collusion cannot 
 
procedural and substantive fairness “is more than a bit of a misnomer, as the overriding 
consideration is whether the substantive terms of the transaction were fair”). 
 175.  See Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, 16 A.3d 48, 94–95 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(pointing out the anomaly in Delaware corporation law and noting that the poison pill was 
created as an attempt to address this flaw). 
 176.  Brian J. McTear, Comment, Has the Evolution of the Poison Pill Come to an 
End?—Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.; Mentor Graphics, Inc. v. Quickturn Design Systems, 
Inc., 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 881, 884–85 (1999). 
 177.  Courts differ on how difficult a poison pill may make a takeover while still being 
permissible under Delaware law. Compare Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 
A.3d 310, 337 n.182 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that an acceptable defensive measure should 
“leave a proxy insurgent with a fair chance for victory . . . .”), with Selectica, Inc. v. Versata 
Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at *20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010) 
(applying a stricter standard and holding that, for a pill to be impermissible, the chance of 
defeating the defensive measure must be “‘mathematically impossible’ or ‘realistically 
unattainable.’”) (quoting Carmody v. Toll Bros., 732 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998)). 
 178.  Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 544–45. 
 179.  Id. at 544. 
 180.  These arguments are, like much else in this Article, drawn from Professor Rock’s 
work.  See id.  I only discuss two of Professor Rock’s five arguments on this point.  First, I 
pass over his argument based on “allocational efficiency.”  This argument recognizes that 
joint bargaining by shareholders may be beneficial because, if shareholders were not able to 
force bidders to buy them out at a higher price by colluding, they would be less likely to 
invest in the corporation in the first place—which would lead to suboptimal amounts of 
investment.  Id. at 540.  I pass over this argument because although Rock recognizes its 
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be defended on the grounds that the shareholders are all co-owners; acting 
as co-owners “does not provide any sort of blanket license for engaging in 
concerted activities.”
181
  Second, despite the fact that small shareholders 
can be “frozen out,” they should not be permitted to bargain jointly.
182
  The 
position of shareholders can be analogized to that of unitholders in oil 
unitization fields.  Unitholders would likely not be permitted to bargain 
jointly to sell their units—and so why should shareholders?
183
 
The first argument is particularly worthy of examination:  The 
contention that collusion between shareholders cannot be justified on 
grounds of co-ownership appears dubious.  Collusion between shareholders 
as co-owners is a form of joint bargaining, and thus functions as a 
horizontal restraint.  The Court’s jurisprudence on joint bargaining is not 
extensive:  It has only investigated such agreements once since the 1930s.  
However, it has found that joint sales agreements are subject to the rule of 
reason.
184
  The question is therefore whether it is procompetitive or 
 
validity, he notes that there is insufficient empirical evidence to evaluate it.  Second, I pass 
over Rock’s “populist” or “distributional” argument, that sellers are no weaker than buyers 
and do not deserve an exemption from the antitrust law.  Id. at 542.  I leave this argument 
aside because I am approaching this question from the opposite direction to Rock, and it is 
not an affirmative argument that sellers of stock should not be allowed to cooperate.  Third, 
I pass over Rock’s “doctrinal” argument, which is that the Williams Act should not be seen 
as repealing the Sherman Act in the market for corporate control.  Id. at 544.  I do not deal 
with this argument because I am trying to establish that antitrust law need not be involved in 
the market for corporate control, not that it is impossible for antitrust law to operate in this 
space. 
 181.  Id. at 533.  Rock relied for support here on the case of NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 
U.S. 85 (1984), in which the Court held that the National College Athletic Association had 
violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts by restricting college football teams from 
negotiating their own television rights agreements with broadcasters.  The Court used NCAA 
in its unanimous ruling in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010), when it 
held that collective licensing agreements by teams that made up the National Football 
League breached section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 182.  Id. at 533. 
 183.  Id. at 536–37. 
 184.  Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).  Broadcast Music held that 
record companies, composers and musicians were permitted to license the copyright for 
their works through agencies that negotiated on behalf of their members as a group.  The 
previous time when the Court had examined a joint sales agreement was Appalachian Coals, 
Inc. v. United States, in which it held that it was legal for coal producers east of the 
Mississippi to form an agency to achieve “the best prices obtainable and, if all [the coal] 
cannot be sold, to apportion orders upon a stated basis.” 288 U.S. 344, 358 (1933).  
Broadcast Music relied directly on a modern conception of the “rule of reason”: on remand, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was directed to “include [in its analysis] an assessment 
under the rule of reason of the blanket license as employed in the television industry . . . .”  
Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24–25.  The rationale of Appalachian Coals can be squared with 
that used in Broadcast Music, but only just.  Chief Justice Hughes, for the majority, wrote 
that “[t]he mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition between 
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anticompetitive for shareholders to collude with each other. 
It has been argued that it is efficient for shareholders to collude when 
they act as co-owners—for example, when they wish to monitor the 
management board.
185
  On the other hand, when they are considering 
whether to sell their shares, they act as competitors—and there is no 
economic justification why they should cooperate.  But this analysis, 
although tempting, is not ironclad.  The division between shareholders as 
“co-owners” and “competitors” is not so precise. 
Shareholders in public companies usually do not see themselves as 
being either a “holder” of stock, or a “seller,” as the above analysis implies.  
It is true that in some circumstances, shareholders may be determined to 
sell the corporation (if it is facing bankruptcy, for example), and in others 
the shareholders may be intent on keeping it (for example, if it is a family-
controlled business).  However, many shareholders will be happy to sell 
their stock if the price is high enough, or to keep it if that is the financially 
more attractive option.
186
  Like members in any organization, shareholders 
are faced with the continual question of whether they should keep their 
membership or “exit” from it.
187
  Seen like this, the decision to cash out an 
investment in a firm is qualitatively no different from any other decision 
that shareholders may take collectively as “co-owners.”  If shareholders 
may combine to elect management as part of their efforts to achieve a 
return on their investment, it is hard to see why they also may not cooperate 
in making decisions whether to sell the company to achieve a return.  This 
argument is particularly forceful when we recall that one of the benefits of 
shareholder cooperation may be to defeat potentially anticompetitive 
 
themselves is not enough to condemn it.”  Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 260.  However, 
the overwhelming tone of the opinion is not one of economic analysis, but concern for the 
social conditions produced by “injurious and destructive [trade] practices.”  Id.  
Appalachian Coals is therefore of dubious authority, and part of its holding in another 
context has been overruled.  See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 
(1984) (holding, contrary to Appalachian Coals, that a parent and its subsidiary must be 
seen as a single enterprise for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 185.  Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 533. 
 186.  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (postulating 
that the only utility gained by shareholders from ownership in a company is the positive 
effect that it has on their wealth and cash flow). 
 187.  This was pointed out most famously by Albert Hirschman in 1970.  ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES 46 (1970).  The shareholder is faced with the continual question of whether he 
should retain his shareholding, or sell it.  Id.; see also John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking 
Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 
120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010) (discussing this framework as applied to mutual fund 
shareholders). 
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practices among sellers.
188
 
At a more fundamental level, the contention that fixing the price of 
shares of a company in a tender offer can be compared to a cartel of 
manufacturers fixing the price of widgets seems mistaken.
189
  Price-fixing 
in a cartel assumes that the entire market (or almost the entire market) is 
subject to the cartel; otherwise, the cartel has no effect and would be 
destroyed as soon as it had begun.  On the other hand, the wide variety of 
substitutes available in companies means that the shareholders of one 
company, by grouping together, do not have the power to raise prices in the 
entire market.  If the price of a target company is too high, the acquirer may 
bid for another company instead.
190
  And although it is true that if every 
company in a given sector adopts a poison pill or another device that raises 
the price that must be paid for the company, there is still a competitive 
market for corporate control.  This competitive market could only be 
defeated if shareholders in different companies were to collude to fix the 
prices of their shares—a situation that is almost inconceivable. 
The second argument outlined above, in my view, is less persuasive.  
According to this argument, selling shareholders are in a better position 
than unitholders in oil fields, because the freezeout rule solves the “free 
rider” and the “holdout” problems caused by shareholders who refuse to 
tender.
191
  Because shareholders are in a better position than unitholders, 
the fact that they can be “frozen out” does not mean that they should be 
permitted to undertake collective bargaining activities that unitholders 
cannot.  But the rules for oil unitization fields in fact place unitholders in a 
situation that is remarkably similar to that of shareholders who are the 
subject of freezeouts.  There is no restriction on collective bargaining by oil 
unitholders to obtain a better price, but the force of this collective 
bargaining is weakened by the fact that it is usually only necessary for an 
oil extractor to obtain consents from a supermajority of unitholders in order 
 
 188.  See supra note 159 (arguing that the practice of shareholder collusion in tender 
offers is in fact procompetitive, not anticompetitive). 
 189.  Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 527. 
 190.  Rock responds to this point by arguing that “collectively shareholders do in fact 
possess market power, within what one might characterize as the submarket for the shares of 
a given target.”  Id. at 529 (emphasis added).  This seems rather unlikely:  There are usually 
many substitutes available for any given company.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, 
Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2001) (noting that it may be possible 
to replicate the effects of insider trading by trading in “stock substitutes”); Amanda M. Rose 
& Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1679 (2011) (noting that 
shareholders of one corporation are likely to be diversified and hold stock in rival 
corporations). 
 191.  Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 536. 
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to proceed with the extraction.
192
  Once the extractor has obtained consents 
from a supermajority, it is permitted effectively to “freeze out” the 
remaining unitholders and pay them royalties for the extraction of their 
resources.
193
  Therefore, the freezeout rule places shareholders in a similar 
position as unitholders.  For these reasons, it does not seem that corporate 
shareholders get any kind of “special treatment” compared to those who are 
subject to antitrust law, and we should therefore not conclude that there is a 
conflict between antitrust and corporate law in the field of tender offers. 
 
C. Constituency Statutes 
State takeover statutes and constituency statutes are other examples of 
where corporate law appears to violate federal antitrust law.  I treat these 
two types of statutes together because constituency statutes can be seen as a 
form of takeover statute.
194
 
The “first generation” of state takeover statutes was developed in the 
1970s.  States sought to intervene in takeovers for domestic companies in 
order to protect local management.
195
  The definition of “domestic 
company” was extremely broad:  For example, Illinois’s statute covered not 
only companies incorporated within the state, but any company of which 
ten percent of the shareholders were located in Illinois, or which had a 
main office in the state and had ten percent of its capital and surplus 
represented within the state.
196
  A corporation could thus be incorporated 
within another state, and conduct almost all of its business in other states, 
yet be subject to Illinois’s laws.  The takeover statutes required bidders to 
submit plans to a state agency and get approval before proceeding with a 
bid; because state review was so protracted, management was put in a 
strong position to resist the takeover.
197
 
It is unsurprising that these statutes were challenged as burdening 
interstate commerce.  In the case that struck down the first generation of 
takeover statutes, Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Court held that Illinois was 
 
 192.  See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4 (2010).  I cite the example of Oklahoma 
because it was the first state to adopt an oil unitization statute. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race 
To Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1179 (1999). 
 195.  ROMANO, supra note 117, at 54. 
 196.  See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627 (1982) (defining a “target company” 
and a registered offer under the Illinois statute). 
 197.  ROMANO, supra note 117, at 54; see also Edgar, 457 U.S. at 627 (describing 
procedure instituted by Illinois’s takeover law). 
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placing an unwarranted burden on out-of-state transactions.
198
  Illinois had 
a legitimate interest in protecting resident shareholders, but had no such 
legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.
199
  States 
responded to Edgar by producing a “second generation” of takeover 
statutes that had narrower bases of jurisdiction, less sweeping 
extraterritorial reach, and were modeled as state regulation of corporate 
governance.
200
  These statutes have various forms.  The most common type, 
“control share acquisition statutes,” provide that a bidder who acquires a 
controlling stake in a corporation is not permitted to vote those shares 
unless a majority of the other (non-controlling) shareholders permits it to.
201
  
Other statutes provide that a party has to pay a “fair price,” dictated by 
statute, in a merger where the party already owns a significant proportion 
of the target company, while still others prevent a bidder from engaging in 
a business combination with an acquired company for a certain period of 
time.
202
  The constitutionality of such statutes was upheld in 1987, in CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
203
  Delaware adopted its own takeover statute the 
following year.
204
 
Finally, states adopted constituency statutes, discussed above.  These 
allow directors to consider the interests of non-shareholders in exercising 
their authority as to whether or not to accept a bid for a company.  Scholars 
have pointed out that they give managers “an even greater ability to 
formulate a legally acceptable reason not to dismantle a poison pill or 
refrain from whatever other defensive maneuvers they might wish to 
engage in.”
205
  Constituency statutes, along with takeover statutes, make it 
harder for bidders to acquire target companies in a hostile takeover. 
Because of their operation, takeover statutes and constituency statutes 
can be seen as posing problems under the antitrust laws.  Control share 
acquisition statutes and constituency statutes in particular present the same 
problem as poison pills:  They force a potential bidder to negotiate directly 
with the directors of a company, and not with individual shareholders.  
Because the directors are elected by all the shareholders, these laws can be 
 
 198.  Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the 
Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 241, 247 (1990). 
 201.  Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 194, at 1178. 
 202.  Id. at 1178. 
 203.  481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 204.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2012); see Guhan Subramanian et al., Is Delaware’s 
Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988-2008, 65 BUS. LAW. 685, 694-
98 (2010) (describing the background of legislative action of the Delaware bar to design an 
antitakeover statute that would survive constitutional challenge). 
 205.  Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 194, at 1180. 
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seen as creating a cartel of shareholders who bargain jointly rather than in 
competition with each other.  Under antitrust law, this could be considered 
illegal. 
These laws are saved, however, under the Parker doctrine, which 
provides one of the exemptions to the nation’s federal antitrust laws.  The 
doctrine holds that “when a state acting in its sovereign capacity announces 
a public policy against free competition in a privately owned industry, then 
state control and regulation thereof, even to the extent of eliminating 
competition, is permissible . . . .”
206
  The doctrine was named after the case 
of Parker v. Brown, in which the appellee challenged the right of California 
to pass regulations concerning the marketing of raisins that would force 
prices up and enrich farmers.
207
  The Court, in upholding the Californian 
regulation, held that there was no violation of the Sherman Act:  “The state 
in adopting and enforcing the [marketing and distribution] program made 
no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of 
trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an 
act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.”
208
 
This was entirely correct—but, as scholars have pointed out, was not 
the question that the Parker Court was asked.
209
  Brown, a farmer of 
raisins, had claimed in the lower court that California’s regulation was 
preempted under the dormant Commerce Clause.
210
  The Supreme Court, 
taking a direct appeal from the three-judge district court, requested 
additional briefing on the question of whether the California regulation 
violated the Sherman Act.
211
  In the event, the Court found that there was 
no Sherman Act violation, and ignored the preemption question 
altogether.
212
 
 
 206.  LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:4 (4th ed. 2011). 
 207.  317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 208.  Id. at 352. 
 209.  See, e.g., Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
77, 81-82 (2006) (arguing that the only question in Parker was whether federal law 
preempted state regulation). 
 210.  Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 896 (1941). 
 211.  Squire, supra note 209, at 82. 
 212.  This was observed by three dissenting Justices some thirty years later, in Cantor v. 
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).  See id. at 618 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  In Cantor, 
the petitioner had sued Detroit Edison, a monopoly provider of electricity that provided 
power to southeastern Michigan, for violating the antitrust laws through its practice of 
handing out replacement light bulbs to customers free of charge.  This “tying” arrangement 
could not be changed without the approval of the state of Michigan:  The distribution of 
light bulbs was approved by the state Public Service Commission, and the cost of the 
replacement light bulbs was included in the electricity rates, which could only be changed 
with state permission.  Id. at 582–83. 
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Nevertheless, courts have continued to treat the question of state 
Sherman Act violations and preemption under the Commerce Clause as one 
and the same.  The Court articulated the state action doctrine in its current 
form in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc.
213
  The appellee, Midcal, was a wine wholesaler that wished to sell 
wine for prices lower than those posted on schedules by state wine 
producers, in contravention of state regulation.
214
  The Court laid down two 
requirements for state action to receive immunity under the Parker 
doctrine:  The “challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy,’” and “the policy must be ‘actively 
supervised’ by the State itself.”
215
 
The Parker doctrine protects state takeover statutes from antitrust law.  
State takeover laws are “clearly not prohibited by the Sherman Act.”
216
  
The logic of the Parker doctrine has been challenged.
217
  However, the 
result—in the market for corporate control, at least—is not objectionable.  
In the case of takeover statutes, corporations may often choose to opt out of 
the takeover statute altogether,
218
 and shareholders who are unhappy with 
their corporation’s use of a state takeover statute may even force the 
corporation to reincorporate in a state with a less stringent statute.
219
  
Delaware’s statute has not had a significant effect on preventing changes in 
control, and it is highly dubious that any federal regulation is required.
220
 
 
IV. ANTITRUST LAW STEPPING IN: THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ACT 
The discussion above argued that, in three areas, the market for 
 
 213.  445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
 214.  Id. at 99–100. 
 215.  Id. at 105. 
 216.  Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 558. 
 217.  E.g., Squire, supra note 209 (arguing that the Supreme Court has confused whether 
market conduct encouraged by state law violates the Sherman Act, and whether state law 
conflicts with the Sherman Act and is thus pre-empted); Dirk C. Phillips, Note, Putting 
Parker v. Brown and Its Progeny in Perspective: An Assessment of the Supreme Court’s 
Role in Development of Antitrust Federalism, 16 J. L. & POL. 193 (2000) (examining 
jurisprudence in wake of the Parker decision). 
 218.  See Springer, supra 84, at 101–02 (detailing opt-in and opt-out provisions). 
 219.  ROMANO, supra note 117, at 57.  Moving states does not guarantee that hostile 
bidders will be able to overcome the takeover statute.  See Subramanian et al., supra note 
204 (showing that, in twenty years, no hostile bidder had managed to overcome the hurdles 
imposed by Delaware’s takeover statute).  However, shareholders may be able to force the 
corporation to opt out of it. 
 220.  Subramanian et al., supra note 204, at 705 (noting that poison pill is a much more 
important defense to hostile bids for Delaware corporations than section 203). 
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corporate control is functioning adequately without antitrust law.  I now 
move to a final area, where it has been necessary for antitrust law to step in.  
This is merger activity regulated by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR). 
 
A. The Effect of HSR 
HSR was enacted in 1976.  At this time, the Court was beginning to 
apply the principles of the Chicago school to its jurisprudence, which 
focused on economic efficiency rather than a doctrinal approach that “big is 
bad.”
221
  The economy was also becoming globalized, reducing the force of 
the populist appeal for small companies over large, and HSR can be seen as 
a backlash against this.
222
  HSR was divided into three titles.  The first title 
was “Antitrust Civil Process Act Amendments;” the second, “Premerger 
Notification;” and the third, “Parens Patriae.”
223
  Of these, it is the second 
title that is the focus of the following discussion. 
The premerger notification requirement mandates that, provided that 
the transaction or either the acquirer or acquired corporation is of a certain 
size, the parties must inform the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice of the 
transaction.
224
  The parties must then wait to obtain antitrust approval:  This 
waiting period is thirty days long (fifteen days in the case of a cash tender 
offer), although it may be shortened if the FTC and DOJ determine that 
they do not wish to take any action in respect of the transaction, and may 
be lengthened if they decide that they need more time.
225
  There are also 
various exceptions to the waiting requirement.
226
 
The waiting period, and its exceptions, are examples of antitrust law 
 
 221.  Sims & Harman, supra note 70, at 872. 
 222.  Id. at 872–76. 
 223.  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 
Stat. 1383, 1383, 1390, 1394 (1976). 
 224.  15 U.S.C. § 18a(a), (d) (2006).  The requirements for the merger notification are 
somewhat complex.  The acquirer must file if the total transaction is worth more than 
$283.6 million.  Id. § 18a(a)(2)(A) (2006); 78 Fed. Reg. 2406 (Jan. 11, 2013).  
Alternatively, the acquirer must file if a transaction is worth $70.9 million, and either (i) the 
acquirer has annual net sales or assets greater than $141.8 million, and the acquired stock or 
assets are of a manufacturing enterprise that has net sales or assets greater than $14.2 
million; or (ii) the acquirer has annual net sales or assets greater than $141.8 million, and the 
acquired assets are of a non-manufacturing enterprise that has total assets greater than $14.2 
million; or (iii) any voting securities of a person with annual net sales or total assets of 
$141.8 million are being acquired by a person with total assets or net sales of at least $14.2 
million.  15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(B) (2006); 78 Fed. Reg. 2406 (Jan. 11, 2013). 
 225.  15 U.S.C. § 18a(b), (e)(2) (2006). 
 226.  Id. § 18a(c). 
WALTER - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2013  4:23 PM 
792 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
affecting corporate law.  The effect of the HSR waiting period is to make it 
harder for bidders to acquire companies quickly and discreetly; any 
sizeable transaction will need to be reported to the authorities.  This makes 
it easier for a competing bidder to attempt to “jump” the deal and make its 
own bid.
227
  There is evidence that HSR has reduced the frequency of 
takeover bids; bidders are worried that they will fail to win their target, and 
so decline to go to the expense of bidding at all.
228
  At the same time, 
premiums received by shareholders on account of these waiting periods 
have not necessarily increased.
229
  In this way, HSR can be seen as cutting 
across the goals of corporate law.  Corporate law aims at maximizing the 
value received by shareholders for their stock.
230
  HSR makes it less likely 
that a bidder will attempt to buy the shareholders’ stock, and does not 
compensate for this with an increase in the consideration offered if the 
bidder does decide to bid. 
HSR contains twelve exceptions to the waiting period.
231
  These cover 
a range of transactions, such as “acquisitions of goods or realty transferred 
in the ordinary course of business,” and various kinds of acquisitions that 
are aimed at passive investment rather than active control.
232
  One of these 
exceptions is particularly relevant.  “[A]cquisitions of voting securities of 
an issuer at least 50 per centum of the voting securities of which are owned 
by the acquiring person prior to such acquisition” are exempted from Hart-
Scott-Rodino.
233
  Under this exception, an acquirer that already has a 
majority stake in a corporation is able to squeeze out minority shareholders 
without causing antitrust concerns. 
 
B. Assessing HSR Alongside Corporate Law 
Given this Article’s proposition for the correct interaction between 
antitrust and corporate law, what should we make of HSR?  The waiting 
period that is mandated in certain circumstances by HSR interferes with the 
management of corporations and affects how likely a company is to bid for 
another corporation.  However, the waiting period is designed to prevent a 
 
 227.  See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 
YALE J. ON REG. 119, 156 (1992) (“Any regulation that delays the consummation of a hostile 
bid, for example, increases the likelihood of an auction by providing time for another bidder 
to enter the fray, upon the target’s solicitation or otherwise.”). 
 228.  Id. at 178. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 231.  15 U.S.C. § 18(c) (2006). 
 232.  Id. § 18(c)(1), (2). 
 233.  Id. § 18(c)(3). 
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worse evil:  The need to “unscramble” a consummated merger transaction.  
The proponents of HSR noted that it was “difficult at best, and frequently 
impossible” to reverse such transactions.
234
  This fact both reflected the 
business realities of trying to disentangle two combined enterprises, and the 
fact that courts before the passage of HSR were reluctant to order the 
break-up of newly combined firms.
235
  The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act can thus 
be seen as a necessary response to a problem that corporate law could not 
solve on its own.  In this regard, HSR is similar to the Sherman Act, 
described above:  It corrects for a failure in state corporate law.
236
 
HSR takes a consciously transaction-focused approach:  It interferes 
with certain classes of transactions that firms undertake.  This is more 
successful than a “market-based” approach, which is effectively what 
existed before HSR was enacted, and is what provided the stimulus for 
HSR.
237
  This approach led to long delays because it engendered litigation 
and did not have the certainty of HSR’s bright-line rules.
238
  In the 
particularly notorious El Paso case, it took seven years of litigation before 
the Supreme Court ordered the acquiring company to divest itself of the 
target company, and then another ten before the divestiture actually 
occurred.
239
  Clearly, a bright-line rule has benefits. 
Nevertheless, HSR should still avoid as much as possible distorting 
the market for corporate control.  Ironically, the exemptions to HSR risk 
are causing this distortion.  By excluding certain kinds of transactions that 
are not considered problematic from HSR’s scope, they risk 
disproportionately encouraging these transactions over others. 
The squeeze-out exception is a case in point.  On its face, it makes 
sense.  The acquirer already has majority control; it already has the voting 
power to cause the target company to collude with it and act in an anti-
 
 234.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2640-
41. 
 235.  See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & 
ECON. 43 (1969) (noting that, in the decade between 1950 and 1960, the government only 
managed to undo the effect of ten out of eighty-one mergers that it challenged under the 
Celler-Kefauver Act).  Corporate law courts have also recognized the difficulties inherent in 
trying to unscramble takeovers.  See, e.g., Coggins v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc., 
492 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Mass. 1986) (noting that appropriate relief granted for 
impermissible merger is usually rescission, but that specific performance may be impossible 
in some instances). 
 236.  See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 237.  William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 826–28 (1997). 
 238.  See Easterbrook, supra note 67 (noting the difficulty that judges have in applying 
flexible tests). 
 239.  See Baer, supra note 237 (citing United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 
U.S. 651 (1964)). 
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competitive manner.  The increase in shareholding, therefore, should make 
no change to the behavior of the controlled company.  However, corporate 
law differs on this point.  Just because a parent company has a majority 
stake in, and controls, a subsidiary does not mean that the parent can run 
the subsidiary in such a way as to benefit it and harm the subsidiary’s 
minority shareholders.  The directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty 
to all the shareholders of a corporation, not just the majority 
shareholders.
240
 
The squeeze-out exception does not create a conflict between antitrust 
and corporate law. But the two bodies of law seem incoherent.  A 
shareholder is typically reckoned to have a controlling stake in a 
corporation when its shareholding reaches about thirty percent.
241
  Despite 
this, HSR approval is required for acquisitions of stakes much smaller than 
thirty percent, provided that they reach the bar above; but approval is not 
required when a corporation wants to close out a minority stake in order to 
take a subsidiary private. 
This type of HSR review for transactions in which a shareholder 
increases its already-controlling stake appears to function more like the 
disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the Williams Act, which 
requires any person who obtains more than five percent of a class of 
securities registered under the Exchange Act to file a beneficial ownership 
report with the SEC.
242
  This provision of HSR thus imitates a feature of 
federal securities law that is an integral part of the broader corporate law 
regime.  But, because the shareholder already has a controlling stake, HSR 
review seems to add little value.  Furthermore, HSR review at this level 
 
 240.  See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (stating that where 
majority shareholder ran a corporation to benefit itself rather than the entirety of the 
corporation’s shareholders, that majority-minority relationship was potentially subject to 
increased scrutiny, in order to confirm intrinsic fairness of dealing). 
 241.  This explains various aspects of takeover codes and accounting regulations.  In the 
United Kingdom, for example, a bidder who obtains a thirty percent in a company is obliged 
to offer to bid for the remaining shares, as the other shareholders are deemed minority 
shareholders.  John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1727, 1763–64 (2007).  In accounting, corporations may be obliged to consolidate 
the accounts of a subsidiary on their balance sheet if they have between twenty and fifty 
percent of the stock.  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 35: 
CRITERIA FOR APPLYING THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENTS IN 
COMMON STOCK (1981), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata& 
blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820931007&blobheader=applicatio
n%2Fpdf.  Cf. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 359–60 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (noting that a shareholder that has a stake greater than 20% in a company may be able 
to form a control bloc). 
 242.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). 
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potentially has a distorting effect on investments.  Small purchases are 
closely scrutinized:  An acquirer that wishes to take an initial five percent 
stake in a target may need to wait for approval.  If a shareholder has a 
controlling stake of thirty-five pecent and wishes to raise it to forty percent, 
it may still need to wait.  But if the shareholder has a stake of fifty percent 
and wishes to increase it further, it will not have to wait.  At the margin, 
this discourages shareholders from investing until their stake reaches the 
magic—but, in terms of control, unimportant—number of fifty percent.  
The squeeze-out exception creates a tension with corporate law:  This 
illustrates the risks of antitrust law regulating the market for corporate 
control by seeking to regulate certain transactions firms may carry out. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Rock noted:  “Antitrust is about markets; corporate law is 
about firms.”
243
  He then argued that this separation was unwarranted.  This 
Article has suggested a different view:  Antitrust law should only operate in 
the market for corporate control when there is a market dysfunction that 
corporate law cannot fix on its own.  By and large, antitrust law, with its 
market-based approach, and corporate law, with its firm-based focus, 
coexist successfully.  Antitrust law only interferes in the market for 
corporate control, as in the case of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, when there 
is a problem in the market for corporate control that corporate law cannot 
solve. 
The role of antitrust law in the market for corporate control is 
currently being litigated in Dahl v. Bain Capital.
244
  Notwithstanding the 
allegations in that case, this Article has argued that corporate law already 
has tools to ensure a competitive market for corporate control.  This Article 
has identified one minor instance—the squeeze-out exception to HSR—in 
which antitrust law takes a transaction-based approach, and overlaps with 
corporate law in a way that does not appear to serve a useful purpose.  This 
exception should be fixed; but, in the main, antitrust law and corporate law 
are coexisting well. 
 
 243.  Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 498. 
 244.  589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008); see supra note 13 (denying private equity 
funds’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis that the pleadings sufficiently alleged a 
Sherman Act claim). 
